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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030110CA

v.
CHRISTENA B. WHITE,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count each of
securities fraud and offer or sale by an unlicensed broker/dealer
or agent, both third degree felonies (R. 3-5). This Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (2002) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Should defendant's constitutional arguments, neither

argued nor ruled upon by the trial court, now be considered for
the first time on appeal?
2.

Is defendant precluded from arguing on appeal that the

jury should have been instructed on exemptions from registration
under the Utah securities laws, where her trial counsel

specifically agreed that registration was not relevant to this
case?
3.

Should this Court consider defendant's argument that the

trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence,
where defendant's claims lack specificity and are inadequately
briefed?
4.

Should this Court review defendant's other inadequately

briefed claims?
Where claims are inadequately briefed or improperly before
the Court, this Court declines to address them.
961 P.2d 299, 304-05

(Utah 1998).

State v. Thomas,

Consequently, no standard of

review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, governing fraud, provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly, to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1), governing licensing, provides in
pertinent part:

-2-

It is unlawful for any person to transact
business in this state as a broker-dealer or
agent unless the person is licensed under
this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (a) (i), defining who is an
"agent" for purposes of the Utah Uniform Securities Act,

(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer
or issuer in effecting or attempting to
effect purchases or sales of securities.
"Agent" does not include an individual who
represents:
(a) an issuer, who receives no
commission or other remuneration, directly or
indirectly, for effecting or attempting to
effect purchases or sales of securities in
this state, and who:
(i) effects transactions [in
exempted securities]. . .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21, governing penalties for
violations, provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree
felony who willfully violates any provision
of this chapter except Section 61-1-1. . . .
(2) A person who willfully violates Section
61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if,
at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained
or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or
less. . . .

-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of securities
fraud and offer or sale by an unlicensed broker/dealer or agent,
both third degree felonies (R. 3-5).

Defendant waived a

preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial on both charges
(R. 47). A jury convicted her as charged (R. 153, 155).

The

trial court sentenced her to concurrent, suspended terms of zeroto-five years in the Utah State Prison on each count; fourteen
days in the Salt Lake County jail; 300 hours of community
service; and' 36 months probation (R. 169-71).

The court also

ordered that defendant participate in cognitive restructuring
therapy (Id.).

Defendant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice

of appeal (R. 179) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Scott Ockey, owner of two condominium units at American
Towers in Salt Lake, ran a newspaper advertisement seeking a
tenant for one of the units, for which he sought $2000 per month
rent (R. 203: 23. 25).

Defendant, an acquaintance, responded to

the ad (Id^ at 26).
Because defendant was short on cash, she and Ockey agreed
that defendant would pay $1500, the amount of Ockey's mortgage,
in cash each month.

For the first six months of the lease, the

1

The facts are recited, as always on appeal, in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5,
52, 999 P.2d 565.
-4-

remaining $500 would be supplied by stock in defendant's
developing business, Shakti Power, Inc. (Id. at 27-28, 31) .
Defendant told Ockey that, for purposes of rent, she would value
the stock at $.10 per share, although it was actually worth $1
per share (Id. at 28).2 Subsequently, Ockey also agreed to take
stock in lieu of the first month's rent on the unit (Id. at 29).
Defendant told Ockey that she wanted to use the condominium as a
home office for Shakti Power (Id. 31). Ockey responded that it
was a residential unit and, consequently, that she could only
rent it as an individual (Id. at 31, 54). She agreed to do so
(Id. at 32) .
Prior to entering this agreement, defendant did not inform
Ockey that she had filed for bankruptcy in 1999 (Id. at 33). Nor
did she provide him with a financial statement or information
outlining Shakti's assets (Id. at 34). She did not tell him
about the risks inherent in the company, how long it had been
incorporated, or anything about its track record (Id. at 34-35).
She did, however, tell him that she had substantial New York
investors involved in the project, which would develop geothermal
power; that the company had either a "fee title interest or lease
hold interest" in property near Mammoth, Utah; and that she

2

Defendant later told the Director of Enforcement for the
Utah Division of Securities, that she "just kind of made up" the
value of $1 per share (R. 203: 97).
-5-

anticipated trading to begin on the stock shortly (id. at 35,
62) .
Prior to signing the lease, defendant told Ockey that her
board of directors was giving her a hard time about valuing the
Shakti shares at only $ .10 each (Id. at 32). Describing his
reaction, Ockey recalled telling defendant,
create any problems here.

XM

I'm not trying to

You know, if you just want to do the

straight $2000 as original I'm fine with that'" (Id. at 32). He
continued, "The $2000 amount was all I was looking for on the
rental and nothing more and nothing less and I wasn't interested
in . . . causing any friction between any other parties" (Id.).
Defendant responded, however, that she had already received
approval from her board and that she would deliver the shares the
next week (Id.).
Defendant delivered two Shakti Power, Inc. stock
certificates, one for 25,000 shares and one for 30,000 shares,
both in the name of Scott Ockey (Id. at 38; St. Exh. # 2 , 3).
Ockey, who had been a licensed broker in the 1980fs, noticed
immediately that each certificate lacked a corporate seal, a
CUSIP number, and the name of the transfer agent (R. 203: 36, 3839).

Concerned, Ockey contacted defendant and asked her, "^Where

in the hell did you come up with these?

It looks like you just

printed them o f f " (Id. at 47). He told defendant "that [he] was
not interested in taking any stock as partial consideration for

-6-

rent and that if she wanted to rent the premises that it would be
$2000 a month" (Id^ at 42). Defendant admitted she had printed
the certificates, but told Ockey she was "in the process of
getting [new certificates] and would have those in the next few
days for [him]" (Id. at 42, 47). Ockey never received the new
certificates (Id. at 42).
In September, Ockey received a rent check from Shakti Power,
signed by defendant, for $1500 (Id. at 43; St. Ex. #5). Ockey
repeatedly tried to cash the check but was unable to do so
because the account on which it was written contained
insufficient funds (Id. at 44).
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTS, NEITHER ARGUED NOR RULED
UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT, SHOULD NOT
NOW BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL
Of the twelve issues upon which defendant urges
this Court to reverse her conviction in this pro se brief, four
are framed as constitutional issues.

She asserts that Utah Code

Ann. §61-1-1 is unconstitutionally overbroad; that article I,
section 5 of the Utah Constitution permits this Court to
invalidate certain federal laws because they conflict with Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1; and that her Due Process rights were violated
both by her counsel's waiver of preliminary hearing and by her

-7-

incarceration in the county jail for 14 days after conviction.
See Br. of Aplt. at 4-5.3
Defendant failed to raise any of these four arguments at
trial and so has waived consideration of them on appeal.

"As

Utah courts have reiterated many times, we generally will not
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellee
raises on appeal for the first time."

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d

65, 77 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991).

Furthermore, defendant has failed

to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances, the two
means by which she might circumvent the waiver doctrine.

See

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 & n.3 (Utah 1993); State v.
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989).

For these reasons, her

constitutional claims should not be considered on appeal.

3

These are the first, second, seventh, and twelfth
arguments identified by defendant in her Statement of Issues.
See Br. of Aplt. at 4-5. They are also referenced in Points Two
and Three of defendant's brief. See id. at 16-19.

POINT TWO
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR FROM
ARGUING ON APPEAL THAT THE JURY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON
EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION UNDER
THE UTAH SECURITIES LAWS BECAUSE
HER TRIAL COUNSEL AGREED THAT
REGISTRATION WAS NOT RELEVANT TO
THE CASE
Defendant argues that

vv

the Jury should have been instructed

regarding the applicable exemptions to the Utah State Securities
Laws under which the subject transaction occurred," specifically
exemptions from registration (Br. of Aplt. at 4, 21).4 This
argument fails at the outset because during the objections to
jury instructions, defense counsel specifically agreed with the
trial court that the matter of registration was not relevant to
the case the State presented against defendant.
After the State's evidence was in and before defendant
presented her case, the court discussed proposed jury
instructions with the parties.

See R. 204: 141-68.

The

following interchange occurred:
Court:

[P]art of the issue that [defense
counsel]'s concerned about is the
issue of registration or not
registration, and I'm not sure how
relevant that is to really what the

4

This argument is included as the fifth and sixth issues
in defendant's Statement of Issues, as well as at Point Five of
defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 4, 21-22. The State's
response encompasses the arguments defendant asserts in Point One
of her brief as well.
-9-

State's case has been - which is
that there was a duty - I mean the
State presented a pretty simple
case that there was a duty to
disclose certain things that
weren't disclosed, and there was a
misrepresentation period, and the
issue of registered and not
registered doesn't seem to be part
of the State's case.
Prosctn:

Registration is -

Defense:

I agree.

Prosctn:

- we didn't file a lack of
registration. We agreed this is an
isolated transaction, so under the
statute it's not required to be
registered, so we didn't charge
that.

Defense:

Agreed.

Id. at 149-50.
Given this unambiguous exchange, defendant's argument on
appeal runs afoul of the invited error doctrine.

"The doctrine

of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at
trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Henderson,
792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).

The doctrine thus prevents a party from

VNX

tak[ing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that

party led the trial court into committing the error.'"

State v.

Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d
at 1220) . Adherence to the invited error doctrine serves dual
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purposes.

First, it ensures that trial courts will have the

first opportunity to address claims of error.

And second, it

discourages parties from misleading the trial court in order to
preserve hidden grounds for reversal on appeal.

State v.

Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, SI54, 70 P.3d 111 (citations omitted).
In this case, because defense counsel specifically
acknowledged the irrelevance of the subject matter for which
defendant now claims a jury instruction should have been given,
her claim must be rejected.
POINT THREE
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS LACK SPECIFICITY
AND ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to admit: l)"a significant official document from the
State of Utah related to defendant's company;" and 2)"information
regarding the victim, including bankruptcies, previous civil
actions and his previous relationship with defendant" (Br. of
Aplt. at 5; see also id. at 20-21).
Both of these claims fail.

First, defendant has not

specified what document the court refused to admit.

Further, she

has not provided record cites to demonstrate that she offered the
alleged document into evidence and that the court ruled on it.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) provides: "The argument
-11-

shall contain the contentions and reasons

of the appellant with

respect to the issues presented, . . . with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts

of

the

R. App. P. 24 (a) (9) (emphasis added).

record

relied

on."

Utah

Absent compliance with this

fundamental rule of appellate briefing, this Court is welljustified in declining to address defendant's claim.

State v.

Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997).
Moreover, defendant has failed to comply with rule 103 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

She did not proffer what the

unspecified "official" document would have shown, nor did she
articulate how the exclusion of the allegedly "significant"
evidence would likely have brought about a different verdict.
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986).

Having

failed to establish either the content or import of this
allegedly

critical evidence, defendant has not established that

the court committed a prejudicial error.

See Utah R. Evid.

103 (a) .
Second, defendant has provided no legal support for her bare
assertion that the trial court should have admitted evidence
about the victim's character, relationships, and financial
affairs.

Defendant's cursory argument of less than a page

contains not a single legal citation and is wholly devoid of
legal analysis.

She fails to explain the import of the position

she takes or what legal authority would compel the result she

-12-

seeks.

An issue is inadequately briefed when "the overall

analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
research and argument to the reviewing court."
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

State v. Thomas,

Such is the case here.

This

Court should not consider defendant's claim.
POINT FOUR
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW ANY OF
DEFENDANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS
BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Defendant asserts a variety of claims on appeal that are
unpreservedf lack specificity, and are unsupported by any legal
analysis or record citations.

She largely ignores the case

presented by the State, instead asserting a variety of
unsupported challenges irrelevant to the case below.

Thus,

defendant argues that the victim was an "accredited investor,"5
and that she is protected by "*Safe Harbor Laws' relating to
^forward looking statements,'"6 matters only tangentially related
to the crimes for which she was convicted.

She vaguely asserts

that the State improperly told the jury "that defendant could not
do things in Utah that she actually had a legal right to do under
both State and Federal securities laws," without ever specifying

5

See Br. of Aplt. at 4 (4th

6

See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (10tn issue in Statement of Issues).
-13-

issue in Statement of Issues).

what those "things" are or what law would permit her to do them.7
She claims that both the court and the State made untrue
statements to the jury, but points to no record evidence to
support her bald assertion.8

Finally, she asserts that her

conduct was not "willful" but fails to cite the definition of
that term, the evidence adduced to support the sufficiency of
proof of the mental state, or any contrary evidence that would
support her position.9
All of these claims are inadequately briefed and,
consequently, should not be considered on appeal.

See, e.g.

State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, 118, 47 P.3d 107; State
v. Marauez, 2002 UT App 127, 512, 54 P.3d 637; see also Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9) (articulating components of adequate
argument).

In several instances, it is difficult to glean even

the faintest outline of defendant's substantive argument.
id. at 14-16, 18-19.

See

Defendant's arguments do not explain the

law inherent in the few cases she cites, nor does she present
any reasoned analysis based on those cases that would compel
the result she seeks here.

See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305

(waiving issue based on rule 24(a) (9) requirement of meaningful
legal analysis).

7

See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (8th issue in Statement of Issues).

8

See Br. of Aplt. at 5 (11th issue in Statement of Issues).

9

See Br. of Aplt. at 4 (3rd issue in Statement of Issues).
-14-

This Court has stated on numerous occasions that it "is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9).

Accordingly, M[w]hen a party fails to offer any

meaningful analysis regarding a claim, we decline to reach the
merits."

State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 52 P.3d 467;

accord State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, fl 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v.
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, SI 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827 P.2d
247, 250 (Utah App. 1992).

Where defendant has wholly failed to

carry her burden of providing this Court with any meaningful
legal analysis to support her claims, those claims are waived.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for securities fraud and offer/sale by an unlicensed
broker/dealer or agent, both third degree felonies.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _ 2 _ d a y

of

January, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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